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A great way to honor Josep Ferrater Mora’s work on the centennial of his 
birth would be to revisit one of the lesser-known and hence less recognized 
areas of his thought. That’s precisely what this book does. Horta’s book devel-
ops a thorough analysis of Ferrater’s moral philosophy, thereby furthering the 
knowledge and appreciation of his original contributions to the field of ap-
plied ethics. The book, then, also serves to acquaint us with some key issues 
of current moral philosophy.
The book not only explains Ferrater’s approaches and propositions, 
but also places his work within the wider context of his contemporaries (Foot, 
Anscombe, Harsanyi, Rawls, Singer), explaining the occasional, often unortho-
dox peculiarities that distinguish his thinking from that of the rest. Moreo-
ver, he goes a step beyond merely explaining Ferrater’s texts, speculating on 
the positions Ferrater might have adopted in keeping with his philosophical 
method (when not ending in uncertainty after an exhaustive analysis of pos-
sibilities). At times, Horta even takes issue with a few inconsistencies, inaccu-
racies or shortcomings in Ferrater’s arguments.
The book is thorough and lucid: the author always offers a concep-
tual analysis of terms, such as “realism”, “naturalism”, “subjectivism” or “rela-
tivism”, thereby ensuring that the labels attached to Ferrater’s ideas are given 
the appropriate meaning.
Horta places greater value on philosophy committed to the present, 
as the essay’s three parts each conclude by referring to the fact that Ferrater’s 
philosophy was “realistic”, not in the sense of “objectivism”, but instead in 
having its “feet on the ground”, in keeping with the problems of the people 
alive at the time. Ferrater was one of the first thinkers to devote himself to 
an area such as applied ethics, which was barely recognized academically on 
the peninsula at that time. In fact, Horta salutes Ferrater’s pioneering effort, 
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acknowledging that it was largely through his dedication to the subject that 
the discipline earned prestige.
The study is based mainly on two of Ferrater’s books on moral phi-
losophy, which the author considers essential: From Matter to Reason and Ap-
plied Ethics. Its structure is divided into three sections: the first is the longest, as 
it provides the systematic framework that endows the rest with meaning, and 
deals with meta-ethics; the second is devoted to normative ethics, and the third 
to applied ethics, particularly the moral consideration of nonhuman animals.
Ferrater’s meta-ethical argument centers on the idea that moral acts 
are real, but not in the Platonic sense of belonging to a separate and inde-
pendent statute away from the world of facts: moral facts, according to Fer-
rater’s four levels of monistic ontology (physical, organic, social and cultural) 
are cultural constuctions relative to the context in which they are produced. 
So he proposes an Emergentist monism with moral implications: there is no 
fixism, no center, no place of privilege reserved for human beings, who con-
struct cultural products as a means for adapting themselves, for satisfying their 
needs in the best way possible.
Ferrater bases his normative ethics on the Aristotelian theory of action, 
acknowledging the ends by which things are done. In classifying the ends, he 
considers three of them to be what he calls “super-sufficient”: life, equality, 
and freedom. But here all resemblance with Aristotle ends, because Ferrater’s 
basis is not metaphysical, but instead is coherent with his four levels of mon-
istic ontology in which he considers the ends to be relative to their histori-
cal contexts, they are universally “preferable” for the majority of beings who 
have interest in how life occurs, but revisable from start to finish. In order to 
avoid confusion, it’s better to refer to them as  “interests” instead of “ends” or 
“preferences”.
Horta employs such precision in order to make Ferrater more coher-
ent and demonstrates that there are really only two “super-sufficient” ends, 
since the interest in equality is in fact secondary. He goes so far as to sustain 
that Ferrater would have been correct in stating explicitly that interest lies in 
having positive experiences of pleasure, and dodging the negative, painful ones: 
this explanation is the vehicle for understanding Ferrater’s specific points about 
life and freedom. These “super-sufficient” interests or ends are minimal and 
there are a number of different ways to satisfy them. Ferrater’s moral philoso-
phy ends up being tolerant, anti-dogmatic and anti-anthropocentric, and for 
that reason he defends the idea of revisability, or the ongoing critical analysis 
of social arrangements to avoid the “crystallization of morality”. Human na-
ture does not exist; everything is historic, in flux. In the same way that equal-
ity is not merely inter-human.
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However, Ferrater’s normative ethics are not relativistic: duties, obliga-
tions, and justifications apply, and not everything goes. Certainly, extrinsic moral 
categorical imperatives do not exist in any moral epoch: everything proceeds 
by way of agreements reached between social groups. However, they must be 
justified once they’re established as the most suitable pacts for life. Here, he 
approaches Rawls’s constructivism: the principles of justice are built by con-
tract. But unlike Rawls, they don’t issue from ignorance, but from the sharpest 
understanding of the reality of the moment; it’s not a matter of universal jus-
tice, but what is validated by a society that has so approved, and furthermore, 
it always proceeds from the bottom and moves upwards.
Since the group and not the individual decide the concepts of right 
and wrong, Ferrater’s moral philosophy doesn’t focus on the personal, but on 
social and political ethics. It rejects any extrinsic moral, metaphysical or natu-
ral objectivism, and it does so counter to any absolutism; humans are physical, 
organic, social and cultural, and their moral constructions are therefore also 
social and cultural. That’s why moral motivation is rooted in sociobiology, be-
cause the phylogenetic evolution of humanity explains why certain preferences 
are chosen over others.
In the third and final section, Horta takes up the field of applied eth-
ics, to which Ferrater devoted the last twelve years of his life, focusing on the 
moral consideration of nonhuman animals. Although Ferrater never wrote a 
book on the subject, it was a central element in his thinking, tied as it is to 
the rejection of anthropocentrism. Through Horta’s pondered reading of Fer-
rater’s two principal books under study, he demonstrates how the philosopher 
goes too far in linking the question of moral consideration of nonhuman an-
imals, to environmental ethics; both issues clearly divide into separate areas in 
the Dictionary, where the very specific entries could only have come from Fer-
rater’s thinking, given his particular philosophical interests, (“speciesism”, “sen-
tient equality”, “animal liberation”, or the broad concept of differential rights).
An analysis of these entries allows one to see the accuracy of Ferrat-
er’s critique of anthropocentrism, where he incorporates it into the context of 
racism and discusses the rights of non-human animals not as universal rights 
and objectives, but as being protectors of their own interests, such as the right 
to live free and in health, in their natural environment. These entries give the 
best demonstration of how Ferrater’s thinking evolved: the paramount inter-
est in living positive experiences of pleasure and avoiding negative ones took 
the place of a maladroit Leibnizian defense of the pluralistic ontology of bio-
diversity, or the notion that such biodiversity somehow enriches the human 
aesthetic. There is no ontological hierarchy between human and nonhuman 
animals, no moral hierarchy, no substantive difference, beyond merely that of 
status. No crucial difference exists. Although Horta does challenge and correct 
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Ferrater by revealing a weakness in his argument, which leans more heavily 
upon some of P. Cohn’s approaches than Ferrater himself admits in Applied 
Ethics, especially when it incurs the logical fallacy of transferring the denial of 
ontological anthropocentrism to the denial of moral anthropocentrism. Fol-
lowing in Ferrater’s footsteps, Horta advocates making a distinction between 
responsible moral agents (only humans, and not all of them) and individuals 
who have interests (and therefore rights, and worthy of moral consideration), 
which defines all human and nonhuman animals (a more universalizing bench-
mark that also holds greater moral relevance).
Translation from Catalan by Valerie J. Miles
